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This paper is in the nature of a progress report rather than a final statement
of results. While our ultimate goal is to embrace as many as possible of
the complex and interrelated factors entering into corporate financing
decisions, our approach has been to start with relatively simple models and
gradually to broaden them by introducing factors which seemed essential
to amore realistic analysis. At this stage we can only present some of our
initial results which focus on the relative roles of debt and equity in finan-
cial decisions.
Perhaps the first problem suggested by the title of the paper is whether
the availability of funds is in a somewhat different category from the terms
at which funds are available. For two reasons we decided to start our work
by concentrating on the cost of funds and its influence on corporate invest-
ment. Both of these reasons follow from a previous decision to deal pri-
marily with the financial behavior of large firms, and this decision in turn
was prompted by the overwhelming importance of large firms in the long-
term credit markets, to which the available statistical data refer.
The first consideration is that, for these firms, absolute limitations can
frequently be interpreted in terms of costs. For example, when financial
executives claim they "simply cannot get" outside equity funds, the reason
often is that the cost of these funds is, in some sense, prohibitive, with the
result that equity funds are not even considered in formulating financing
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plans. Second, terms other than costs, such as restrictions on current or
quick ratios, limitations on future debt, etc., probably do not influence the
financing operations of large corporations to a very great extent and, there-
fore, are probably not very important in explaining the movements of
aggregate data. At any rate, we felt that our analysis could profit by omit-
ting these factors, at least at the start.
The major problem, then, is to define the meaning of the cost of funds.
The cost of debt funds is fairly it is the effective interest rate paid by
the firm to its creditors (taking into account costs of flotation and pre-
miums and discounts). It is the same whether we are co.nsidering the firm
as a whole, or the stockholders. Measuring the cost of common stock
funds, however, is far more complex. To begin with, one has to face the
crucial question of which group's interests are supposed to be considered
in management's financial decision-making. In other words, if we are to
speak of costs, costs to whom? In what follows we have decided to hold to
the conventional assumption that management acts and decides primarily
in the long-term interest of the "present" owners of the firm, i.e., of holders
of shares at the time a financial decision is to be made. This assumption
may not always be in accordance with the facts, but we feel that it is perti-
nent to a sufficiently large number of cases to merit its use, at least as a
starting point.
In view of this assumption, we can dispose of one simple measure of
costs that has occasionally been advanced, namely, the additional divi-
dends that would have to be paid per dollar of new funds acquired through
common stock flotations. A payment of dividends can only be considered
a cost if the payer and the payee are different persons, which obviously is
not the case, since the stockholders are the owners of the firm.
What, then, are the factors controlling the total amount of new financ-
ing and the relative use of long-term debt and equity instruments; if we
assume that management acts rationally to maximize the return to existing
stockholders? Because of the complexity of the problem, our presentation
follows much the same lines as our research, i.e., we first analyze the prob-
lem on the basis of simple assumptions and present the tentative conclu-
sions suggested, and then proceed to introduce more realistic conditions.
CASE ISUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY
Consider first the case in which management is assumed to know the out-
come of any decision with "subjective" certainty. This assumption yields
very simple solutions to our problem which can conveniently be discussed
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SubcaseI-a
ABSENCE OF CORPORATE INCOME TAXES,
AND CONSTANT MARKET FACTORS
Under the general assumption of subjective certainty, the simplest case
is the one in which: 1) corporate income taxes are absent, and 2) the per
share net proceeds from the sale of stock and the effective interest rate
on debt funds are not significantly affected by the financing plan itself, i.e.,
in which market factors can be regarded as parameters of action. In this
case certain conclusions can easily be established. In the statement of these
conclusions, given below, the word "earnings" is to be understood as a
shorthand expression for "anticipated, net, long-run, average, yearly earn-
ings," and "price" as the shorthand expression for "current net proceeds
per share from an issue of stock."
1) If bonds are the only available type of financial instrument, a fixed
amount of new financing will be advantageous, i.e., will increase the earn-
ings of existing stockholders if, and only if, the anticipated rate of return
on new money exceeds the effective interest rate.' lithe amount of new
money to be raised is not a fixed sum, but a variable amount, it will pay to
push new financing to the point at which the marginal rate of return equals
the effective interest rate. This is, of course, a familiar conclusion; nor is it
surprising, since we are proceeding thus far under traditional textbook
assumptions.
2) If common stock is the only available type of financial instrument,
the raising of a given sum will be advantageous, if and only if, the antici-
pated rate of return on new money exceeds the original-earnings/price
ratio, where "original earnings" refers to earnings if no new financing is
undertaken.2 If we treat the amount of new money to be raised as a variable,
then it will pay to push new financing to the point at which the marginal
rate of return equals the earnings-price ratio of the "enlarged" firm.3
3) Even if management is free to use both junior and senior financing
instruments in any desired combination, the most advantageous financial
plan will still involve the use of bonds alone or stocks alone, but not both
simultaneously; i.e., only corner solutions are possible—exceptin the
trivial case where the choice between the two is a matter of complete
indifference.
4) The condition under which stock or bond financing is more advan-
tageous can be stated in terms of the earnings per share that would result
'See Note 1, Appendix C.
See Note 2, Appendix C.
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from the use of the optimum amount of bonds. If the effeëtive rate of
interest is less (greater) than the earnings-price ratio involving this earn-
ings figure, bond (stock) financing is more advantageous. Observe that
this implies that if the effective rate of interest is less than the original-
earnings/price ratio, bond financing must be preferable, but if the relation
between these two factors is reversed, either may be preferable.4
5)Ifcommon stock is the most advantageous instrument, the total
amount of funds acquired will be greater than the amount that would have
been raised through flotation of bonds, and the rate of return on capital at





When corporate income taxes are taken into account, the analysis and
conclusions of Subcase I-a remain essentially unchanged.5 If we use the
word earnings to mean earnings gross of taxes, conclusions 1 through 5
in the previous section remain true as stated.
This does not mean, however, that corporate income taxes have no
effect on the choice of instruments or on the amount of new financing.
Since the market price of a share of stock depends, at least in part, upon
the net earnings per share, a rise' in the corporate income tax, unaccom-
panied by other changes in the corporate picture, will depress the price
of stock. The earnings-price ratio gross of taxes will therefore rise and
prospective returns on new capital will have to be greater than before for
stock financing to be advantageous. For the same reason, a rise in the tax
rate will also swing the balance toward bond financing and against equity
financing.
As an alternative to the method described above, we may use the word
earnings to mean net earnings, as is more usual in speaking of earnings-
price ratios, and introduce a separate factor by which to describe the effects
of corporate income taxes. In this case, conclusions 1, 3, and 5donot
change, and conclusions 2 and 4 may be "corrected" by inserting the words
"a multiple of" in front of every expression referring to an earnings-price
ratio. The multiplier referred to is the reciprocal of unity-minus-the-effec-.
tive-corporate-income-tax-rate.
'See Note 3, Appendix C.
The conclusions of this section have already been substantiated in previous foot-
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This discussion, of course, is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment
of the effects of corporate income taxes. For this purpose, one should also
consider the reactions of other sectors of the economy.6
Before concluding this first section, a word may be added about the
relation of preferred stock financing to both bond and common stock
financing. Under the condition of subjective certainty of estimates, non-
voting preferred stock is very similar to bonds, and preferred dividends are
very similar to interest payments that are not deductible for tax purposes.
Thus, preferred stock financing increases common stockholders' returns
when the rate of return on new money is greater than the tax multiplier
used above times the dividend yield; and it is preferable to bonds only
when this latter factor is less than the effective interest rate. When preferred
stock is compared to common stock, however, it need only meet the test
that the preferred yield be less than the common-stock-net-earnings/price
ratio in order to be preferable, since there is no tax-deductibility advantage
to either of these financial instruments.
Summing up, then, the analysis thus far indicates that the factor con-
trolling financial decisions is the relation between the effective interest
rate, the current effective preferred dividend yield, and the management-
anticipated-earnings/price ratio before taxes. It also leads to the cOnclu-
sion that in the optimum financing plan all money should be secured
through the use of only one type of financing instrument. Furthermore,
from what we know about the usual relations between market factors we
should have to conclude that, under the assumptions of the present model,
stock financing, especially preferred stock financing, would hardly ever
be chosen.
This conclusion follows from the fact that the interest rate is usually
less than the preferred dividend yield and that both of these rates are
usually less than either the current-earnings/price ratio or any of the
usual average-earnings/price ratios. Although none of these latter ratios
is exactly comparable to the pertinent concept of our analysis, they do give
a sufficiently strong indication that interest and preferred yields are usually
also lower than management-anticipated-earnings/price ratios. Indeed,
that they must usually be lower follows from the well-known fact that a
premium must generally be paid to investors to compensate them for the
SeeRichard Goode, "The Corporate Income Tax and the Price Level," American
Economic Review, XXXV (March 1945). In his "Effects of Taxation on Individual
Investment and Corporate Financing," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, CCLXVI (November 1 Dan T. Smith considers the "global"
effects of corporate income taxes in addition to examining their immediate effects on
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additional risks involved in stock ownership. The opposite relation could
therefore only hold if investor anticipations were considerably more opti-
mistic than management anticipations.
The conclusion that stock would hardly ever be used as a vehicle of
financing is only reinforced by tax considerations, as well as by considera-
tions of control. Obviously this conclusion is not in accordance with the
facts since stock financing is a source of new funds, even though a minor
one.
This might imply: 1) that our assumptions as to what constitutes the
stockholders' best interest are too unrealistic; and/or 2) that management
is not primarily motivated by stockholder interest, or at any rate does not
pursue the rational course to this goal; and/or 3) that some other elements
of our model are too far from reality to be useful in explaining observed
behavior. It seems reasonable not to accept the second alternative until we
have explored the remaining two. One assumption that seems particularly
untenable in connection with the problem at hand is that of subjective
certainty of estimates. In Section II, we examine some of the implications
of dropping this assumption.
II
CASE IISUBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
Our starting point will be to recognize that managements' anticipations of
the effects of any action on long-run earnings will not, in general, consist
of a single figure but rather of a whole range of estimated possible out-
comes having varying degrees of likelihood.7 To cast this concept into
operational form, we may think of these anticipations as having the form
of a probability distribution of possible outcomes, and for the sake of sim-
plicity, we will characterize this subjective probability distribution by just
two parameters: 1) a measure of central tendency (such as the arithmetic
mean or the mode) which we will call "expected outcome," and 2) a mea-
sure of dispersion, i.e., of the extent to which the actual outcome is consid-
ered capable of differing from the expected outcome (such as the standard
On the general problem of choices involving risks see: 0. Tintner, "The Theory of
Choice under Subjective Risk and Uncertainty," Econometrica, IX (July-October
1941); M. Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving
Risks," Journal of Political Economy, LVI (August 1948); and the following articles
by J. Marschak: "Money and the Theory of Assets," Econometrica, VI (October
1938); "Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility," and
"Optimal Investment of a Firm" (abstract), both found in Econornetrica, XVIII
(April 1950). See also the bibliography following the article, "Rational Behavior,
Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility."EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 269
deviation or some interquartile range). The latter is clearly a measure of
the risk involved in a given course of action.
Further, a useful discussion of risk must involve the concept of risk
aversion or preference. For if management were completely indifferent to
risk and, therefore, sought only to maximize the "expected" earnings per
share, the conclusions reached in Case I would remain substantially
unchanged. Indeed, the only change required in the previous discussion
would be to substitute the word "expected" for "anticipated" before such
expressions as "rate of return on new money." In particular, it would
remain true that, in any given situation, it would pay to use either debt or
equity financing, but not both.
Of the many possible ways of introducing risk aversion into the analy-
sis, two will be considered here.
Subcase Il-a
RISK AVERSION MEASURED BY CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS
One method that is sometimes used to take uncertainty and risk aversion
into account with a minimum of complication is that of using certainty
equivalents. The certainty equivalent of an uncertain outcome is defined
as the "expected outcome" reduced by a "risk discount factor." This latter
factor is directly proportional to the dispersion of the subjective probability
distribution of outcomes, and is greater, the greater the subjective aversion
to bearing risk.
For the' problem at hand, this method of introducing uncertainty and
risk aversion again does not substantially affect the conclusions reached
under Case I. In particular, it continues to be true that the optimum financ-
ing plan involves the use of bonds alone or stocks alone, but not a combina-
tion of the two. At the same time, as one might expect, the conditions under
which any type of financing is advantageous to old stockholders become
more stringent, and the balance between the two shifts in favor of equity
financing.8
Subcase 11-b
RISK AVERSION MEASURED BY AN EXPLICIT FUNCTION
The influence of uncertainty and of subjective attitudes toward risk bearing
may be analyzed more fully by explicitly introducing a "risk aversion"
function into our model.
Each management recognizes that any action it decides upon may fail
in its earnings objective, and consequently "worsen" the position of exist-
q
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ing stockholders, either absolutely or in comparison with the results of
alternative actions. It is well known that managements differ in the chances
they are willing to take in providing stockholders with earnings. The
"tastes" of a given management in respect are primarily a reflection
of its temperament, i.e., of its adventurousness or cautiousness. To some
extent these "tastes" are also conditioned by the temperament of the stock-
holder group, but in view of the tendency toward "mutual natural selection"
of stockholders and managements, the "tastes" of these two groups are
unlikely to be very dissimilar.
The "risk aversion" function we now introduce is intended to describe
these "tastes" of management. Specifically, we may assume that in choosing
between alternative courses of action the decision-makers take into account
both the "expected outcome" and the dispersion or risk of each alternative
course, the former being a desirable, the latter an undesirable thing, and
that they aim at striking a balance between the two on the basis of the
opportunities open to them and of their "taste," i.e., their willingness to
bear risk. As indicated above, "taste" can be described by a "risk aversion"
or utility function and the endeavor to strike a balance may be translated
into one of maximizing this utility function within the limitations imposed
by the available opp6rtunities.
Because of the complexity of the problem, a rigorous statement of the
conditions under which positive net financing is advantageous and of the
conditions describing optimum balance between debt and equity financing
is best given in mathematical form.9 However, the essential of our
analysis can be described in terms of the familiar graphical analysis of the
theory of consumers' choice. The subjective evaluation of various combi-
nations of profits and risk can be represented by a set of indifference or
"risk aversion" curves; the combinations of these "commodities" that are
within reach of management can be represented by a set of opportunity
curves; and the two sets of curves can be combined to exhibit the maxi-
mizing solutions.
In Figure 1, on the vertical axis we measure ir, the expected, net, long-
run, average annual earnings of the old stockholders, and on the horizontal
axis we measure the dispersion of the subjective probability distribu-
tion of these earnings. Any point on the plane bounded by these axes, then,
represents an inseparable bundle of expected earnings and corresponding
risk; i.e., of a given amount of earnings and the given amount of risk that
must be borne to secure these earnings.
Then, the attitude toward risk and profits is represented by "indiffer-
ence" curves u0, u1, u2, ..., havingthe following characteristics:
Note 5,AppendixC.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 271
Figure 1
RISK AVERSION MEASURED 'BY AN EXPLICIT FUNCTION
1) As is usual, all points along any one curve exhibit combinations
ofand whichare equally preferable.
2) Each of these curves slopes upward from left to right because
dispersion is considered to be undesirable. That is, as between two
ventures having the same expected outcome, the one for which the
dispersion is smaller is the one preferred; consequently, an increase in
dispersion must be accompanied by an increase in expected earnings
if the level of utility is to remain unchanged.
3) The slope of a line at a given point measures the amount of profit
that would be necessary to induce management to accept an extra
"unit" of dispersion. Therefore, the steeper the curve, the greater the
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4) Points lying on curves higher and to the left are preferred to those
lying on curves lower and to the right.
5) Each curve is convex to the horizontal axis indicating that risk
aversion increases with the amount of risk already borne, but decreases
with the amount of profit already enjoyed.
The next step is to represent in our diagram the "market opportunity
function," that is to say, the relation between pairs of values of ir and
that can be secured by management within the limitations imposed by the
given data, i.e., 1) the market factors —pershare net proceeds from sale
of stock and the effective interest rate on borrowed funds, assumed con-
stant; and 2) management anticipation factors —expectedgross return
and the subjective dispersion of returns corresponding to varying amounts
of new money invested in the firm. It turns out that under the conditions
of our problem the entire set of opportunities confronting management
can be represented by afamilyof straight lines like Oo,..., •.. in
Figure 1, all of which intersect the vertical axis at the same point —repre-
sented by point A in our diagram.
In order to get a better understanding of this point, which is of central
importance for the analysis that follows, it will be useful to think of any
financial decision as consisting of two parts: 1) the decision as to the most
advantageous amount (if any) of new funds to acquire, and 2) the decision
as to the extent to which this amount should be secured through debt or
equity, financing. Given the initial debt-equity structure of the firm, this
latter decision determines uniquely a new structure; if we like, we may
therefore think of this second part of the decision as the choice of the most
advantageous debt-equity structure.
Suppose now that point C in our diagram, with coordinates (cro, ir0),
representsthe iiiitial position of the firm before any financial transaction
whatever is undertaken. This point indicates that, with the initial amount
of total assets and the initial debt-equity structure of say B0 dollars of
bonded indebtedness and S0 dollars of common stock (at market prices),
expected stockholders' earnings estimated by management are 'ir0 dollars,
while the uncertainty attached to this estimate is measured by cr0. Now,
even without securing any net new funds, it will generally be possible for
management to move from C to new ir, positions—i.e.,to other points
in our diagram —byengaging in what we may call "pure refinancing opera-
tions": floating stocks and using the proceeds to retire outstanding bonds
and vice versa.
For instance, if the effective interest rate is less than the original-
expected-earnings/price ratio (as is assumed in Figure 1), then, ignoring
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the expected return per share by "trading on the equity," i.e., by refinancing
part of the common stock with bonds. But this will at the same time increase
the- uncertainty that this expected return per share will be realized since
it will decrease the number of shares over which the risk is to be spread.
Thus, if B1 dollars of funds were acquired by issuing bonds and the•
proceeds used to repurchase, at market price, S1 dollars of common stock
(all transactions taking place at constant prices), so that the new balance
sheet would show B0 + B1 dollars of bonded debt while the market value
of equity would become S0 —51 dollars, the new ir,positionof the firm
would be represented by a point like D in our graph, higher and to the right
of C. Similarly, repaying debt through funds acquired by sale of stock
would produce a shift to some other position with lower expected earnings
and lower dispersion and which therefore would be represented by a point
lower and to the left of C, like G in our graph.
Now if we consider the entire set of points that correspond to all combi-
nations of iT, thatcan be achieved by pure refinancing operations of
the type described, it turns out (Note 5, Appendix C) that all these points
fall on a straight line through the point A and C likein our graph. In
other words, the increase (decrease) in expected earnings that can be
secured by "pure refinancing operations" —replacingof equity funds with
debt funds or vice versa, without changing the "size" of the firmturns
out to be a constant multiple of the concomitant increase- (decrease) in
dispersion. -
Sincethe linerepresents all combinations of ir, achievablewith-
out any net acquisition of funds, it may be thought of as the opportunity
line for zero net financing. To each point on linewill of course corre-
sp6nd uniquely a value of B and S adding up to zero. These values of B
and S can unfortunately not be exhibited directly in our graph but they
can be immediately derived from the data of the problem.
It will now be easy to see that the opportunity function for any other
fixed amount of net financing must be represented by another straight line
like bM.Supposefor example that the firm acquired FM dollars of net new
funds by means of a specific combination of junior and senior financing,
say S'M and B'M which together add up toand suppose that as a result
of this operation the positionshifts from the original position C to
a new position, say point I in our diagram. Now there clearly are many
other ir, positionsthat the firm can achieve by using different.combina-
tions of debt and equity financing to secure the same total sum FM. The
interesting point is that all such achievable combinations must again form
a straight line through the point A and I like 0A1inour graph.1°
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This becomes very clear if we now think of J as an initial position just
like C, only corresponding to a larger fixed corporate size. We may then
think also of other jn-,positions that can be achieved by changing the
distribution of FM between bonds and stocks as being achievable by means
of pure refinancing operations starting from J. But as we have just argued,
the relation between the values of ir andthat can be achieved by means
of pure refinancing operations is always a linear one. Thus, the line
will represent the market opportunity function corresponding to the fixed
amount FM of net new financing. To each point on this line will again
correspond uniquely a value of B and S adding up to FM.
Similarly, to any other amount of net new financing, F, there will corre-
spond a different opportunity function and this function will be represented
in our graph by another straight line through A. It follows, finally, that the
entire set of opportunities confronting mahagement must consist of the
family of straight lines corresponding to all possible values of F. The
slope of any such line will depend of course on the initial data, as well as
on the value of F.
So far, then, we have shown 1) that the entire opportunity set may be
represented by a family of "curves," each of which corresponds to a dIffer-
ent value of F; 2) that each of these opportunity "curves" is a straight line
intercepting the vertical axis at a single point, pointA in Figure 1; and
3) that there is an initial line, corresponding to no net financing (F =0),
whichin our graph is line 00,passingthrough points A (the common inter-
cept) and C (the initial position).
We come now to an explanation of the relation between opportunity
curves for successively larger values of F. The slope of the lines may
increase as new funds are acquired or it may decrease." Only if the slope
increases as corporate size is increasedfrom its initial level (as F increases
above zero) will net positive financing be advantageous. In this case, as F
continues to grow larger the opportunity.lines will grow steeper until some
value of F, call it FM, has been reached, after which they will flatten out.
Thus, there will, in general, be some value of F, such as to which
corporate-income-tax-rate, the effective interest rate, and the market value of the
existing shares of stock. See equation (5.11),Note5,AppendixC. It, therefore, is
independent of the form or amount of new financing and is identical for all oppor-
tunity lines.
aThecondition for net positive financing is that the marginal rate of return on new
capitaL should exceed the interest rate by more than a quantity which on the
difference between the original-earnings/price ratio and the interest rate and on
the elasticity of dispersion with respect to new funds. See equation (5.12),Note5,
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wouldcorrespond the steepest opportunity line represented byin our
graph.
Now it is easy to see that this steepest line is, in general, the "best"
opportunity line and the corresponding value of F represents the optimum
amount of financing to be done. Indeed, it is clear that by staying on the
steepest F line, management would be in a position to secure, for any given
value of the greatest value of IT consistent with the available opportuni-
ties. Thus, in Figure 1, .the greatest value of IT,associatedwith=
withinthe opportunity set, is obviously on the steepest line and a simi-
lar result holds for any other value of
Havingthus determined the best opportunity line, the next problem is
that of choosing the best point on this line, i.e., the point that maximizes
the utility function. As in the familiar case of consumers' choice, this will
be the point of tangency between the best opportunity line and an indiffer-
ence curve, such as the point E on the line Os,. As indicated before, to this
point, E, will correspond uniquely a value of net bond financing, B, and
of net stock financing, S, say andwhich together add up to the
optimum amount of financing
What has been said up to this point has the following interesting and
important implications: 1) The total amount of financing in the optimum
financial plan will, in general, be independent of the "tastes" of the deci-
sion-makers as expressed by the risk aversion function; and 2) the opti-
mum financial plan need not involve only one type of financial instrument,
but may include a combination of both junior and senior financing (for
exceptions see Section 11-c below).
As has been shown, the optimum amount of new financing is the
amount that corresponds to the steepest F line and the position and slope
of the F lines are determined entirely by market and anticipation factors
and not by the parameters of the indifference map. In other words, any
decision-maker confronted with the same market and anticipation data
would choose the same amount of total financing regardless of his attitude
toward risk bearing. The influence of tastes spends itself in determining
which point within the line OM will be chosen; that is to say, in determining
the distribution of the total amount, between stock and bond financing.
Decision-makers who are inclined to take more risk than the one whose
tastes are depicted in Figure 1 would be characterized by indifference lines
which are flatter in the neighborhood of E. They would, therefore, choose
a point on to the right of E, which in turn implies having greater
recourse to bonds and less to stock. More cautious decision-makers, on the
other hand, would move from E toward A.276 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
Subcase 11-c
THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
The conclusions reached so far may have to be somewhat restricted if we
take into account certain "institutional" limitations on the values that may
be taken by B and S. The solution of the problem as given in Figure 1 may
well yield values of B and S that are institutionally impossible. For instance,
while the optimum value of F may be positive, the corresponding value of
B may be negative; this would imply raising, through stock issuance, an
amount greater than is necessary to expand the firm, and using the differ-
ence to retire bonds. Now, while there is nothing impossible about this
implication, in principle, it is clear that the firm cannot retire more bonds
than are outstanding. Similarly, it is not usually considered feasible for a
firm to issue bonds for the direct purpose of retiring its common stock;
because of this restriction, the optimum value of S consistent with the
institutional framework cannot be negative (at least as long as the opti-
mum value of F is not negative).
In terms of our graph this means that certain portions of each oppor-
tunity line must be excluded from the solutions. On linefor iilstance,
the portion of the line to the right of C must be excluded because of the
second institutional limitation pointed out above. Similarly, if point G on
Oo denotes the values of ir and attainablewhen all outstanding bonds
have been refinanced by stock, the portion ofto the left of G must be
excluded because of the first factor mentioned above. For the same rea-
sons, two segments of every other opportunity line must be excluded as
"institutionally unfeasible."
It can be shown that these institutional limitations can be translated
into our graph in the form of two "boundary curves" such as CJJ' and
GHH', tangent to °M,thebest opportunity line, at J and H respectively.12
The first of these curves is the locus of points on successive opportunity
lines showing the combinations attainable when all financing is done
by bonds, so that S =0,and B =F;the second is the locus of points on
successive opportunity lines, showing the ir, combinationsattainable
when B =—B0,S =F+ B0 (where B0 is the initial outstanding amount of
bonds). The shape of these two curves depends, of course, on the market
and anticipation factors.
The relevant portion of the institutional opportunity set, then, consists
of the area CGHJ for F and the whole area between A00 and the
curve H'HJJ' if we consider values of F > Similarly the "best opportu-
nity" line degenerates into the curve H'HJJ'. The optimum solution is now
given by the point of tangency of H')IJJ' and an indifference curve.
Thetangency of these curves is shown at the end of Note 5,AppendixC.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 277
Taking the above discussion into account, we can now describe six
types of optimum financial plans that may emerge. Let K represent the
point on OM that corresponds to S =FM,B =0.Case 1: If the point of
tangency of the indifference curve with the "best" opportunity curve lies
between K and J, the optimum financing plan will involve both stocks and
bonds. Case 2: If the tangency point falls at H or between H and K, only
stock will be issued, but some (all at H) of the outstanding bonds will be
retired with part of the proceeds. In both cases the same total net amount
of funds will be acquired and the conclusion about the independence of
tastes and the amount of net financing will hold.
In Case 3 the tangency point falls in the sector JJ'; in Case 4 it falls
in the sector HH'. We shall describe only the former case and allow the
reader to apply a similar reasoning to the latter. Case 3, then, would lead
to a financing plan involving the use of bonds alone, but the total amount
of funds acquired would be greater than FM, say FN. The excess of FN over
may be thought of as a substitute type of "trading on the equity" which,
in the absence of restrictions, would have been done by retiring part of
the common stock, thus moving to the right of .1 on line Furthermore,
since the value of FN depends on the specific point of tangency, the total
amount of financing must depend on the shape of the indifference curve.
The flatter the indifference curves in the neighborhood of J, the greater
this amount would be. Whether or not such cases are empirically impor-
tant depends on the specific values of the market and anticipations data
and cannot be settled on theoretical grounds. It would seem, however, that
FN is unlikely to be much larger than FM so that the independence of tastes
and total amount of financing may still be approximately true.
Cases 5 and 6 are the trivial cases where the point of tangency falls
exactly at K or J. In these, the plan will call, respectively, for sale of stock
alone or issuance of debt instruments alone, without any refinancing.. The
independence of tastes and amount of financing holds for these two cases
and the total net amount of funds acquired is the same as in Cases 1. and
Subcase II-d
CONSIDERATION OF CORPORATE INCOME TAXES
In the previous section we have not found it necessary to have much refer-
ence to the corporate income tax rate, even though the presence of such
taxes was taken into account in deriving our results. The reason is essen-
tially the same as was discussed for Subcase I-b, namely that the effect
of such taxes shows up primarily in influencing the price per share.
The optimum financial plan depends, among other things, on the
relation between the earnings-price ratio gross of taxes and the interest278 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
rate. Corporate income taxes, therefore, affect the solution of the problem
by influencing the price per share which presumably depends on earnings
net of taxes. On the basis of our model a decrease in price, other things
being equal, can be shown to bring about, in general, a decline in the opti-
mum amount of total Hence, to the extent that an increase in
corporate taxeswithunchanging expectations of earnings gross of taxes
—depressesthe price per share, such an increase will also tend to reduce
the total amount of financing. The effect such an increase would have on
the distribution of new financing between stocks and bonds is not unambig-
uous. In general, it would seem likely to encourage the use of debt as against
equity financing. But this is not necessarily true as it depends partly on
the shape of the indifference map. The fall in price would tend to make the
"best" F line steeper and this would produce a "substitution" effect toward
greater bond financing.
At the same time, however, there is a deterioration in the opportunities
available, and this produces an additional effect not unlike the income
effect in the theory of consumers' choice. This effect is also likely to pull
in the direction of bond financing if, as seems reasonable, an over-all
decline in opportunities makes people more willing to take risk for the sake
of keeping up the "expected" income. However, the opposite outcome is




The previous discussion presents that part of the development of our model
which we feel justified in exhibiting at this time. We have made several
attempts to broaden the model by introducing less restrictive assumptions
about market factors, and by introducing other financing alternatives
besides common stock and long-term debt; but the broader model has not
yet reached the stage of maturity.
In spite of the inèompleteness of the conclusions, a brief summary may
be useful. Traditional economic theory considered only debt financing,
and hence limited its conclusion on business expansion to the well-known
condition of equality between the marginal productivity of capital and the
interest rate.14 However, as corporation finance specialists have pointed
SeeNote 6, Appendix C.
14Morerecently, the effect of risk on interest cost has been taken into account. See,
for instance, Michal Kalecki, Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations (Lon-
don: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1939), Chapter 4; and Albert G. Hart, Antici-
pations, Uncertainty, and Dynamic Planning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
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out for some time, without drawing exact conclusions,15 corporate expan-
sion can also be financed by selling shares of ownership. When equity
financing is used, a new cost element enters the picture, namely, the ratio
of expected earnings per share, gross of taxes, to tile effective market price
of stock.
The essential quality of this type of instrument is its ability to reduce
the risk borne by the owners, while at the same time forcing them to accept
lower returns than could be provided if other instruments were used. It is
not surprising, therefore, that only when the desire to limit risk is taken
into account does the analysis lead to conclusions that are not inconsistent
with observed facts. If subjective certainty of estimates is assumed, or if the
adjustment for uncertainty is made by means of a risk discount factor, we
obtain the unrealistic conclusion that the most advantageous financial plan
involves the use of only one instrument (at least as long as market data
remain approximately constant). Furthermore, given the usual market
relations between costs, the former assumption would make e4uity financ-
ing extremely rare.
When an explicit risk aversion function is brought into the analysis,
our model leads to conclusions that are not inconsistent with observed
facts. Stock financing alone and "combination" financing both become
definite possibilities. The composition of the optimum financing plan de-
pends on the strength of decision-makers' willingness to bear risk for the
sake of increasing expected returns, as well as on market factors and expec-
tations of management. But while "tastes" enter into the decision as to
the composition of the plan, they do not neêessarily influence the total
amount of money to be acquired. That is, for certain ranges of anticipation
and market data, the optimum total amount of financing is determine.d
exclusively by market and expectation factors.
The fact that, in reality, "corner solutions" predominate is also not
inconsistent with our results, for they indicate that these solutions are also
perfectly possible. Note, however, that according to our analysis, "corner
solutions" are associated in general (though not necessarily) with situa-
tions in which the optimum amount of financing is not independent of
tastes. Therefore, even if the remaining assumptions of our model are suffi-
ciently realistic, the range of situations in which F is independent of tastes
may not be empirically very large.
15Typicaltextbook discussions may be found in W. H. Husband and J. C. Dockeray,
Modern Corporation Finance (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 1948); F. F. Burtchett
and C. M. Hicks, Corporation Finance (New York: Harper and Brothers, rev. ed.,
1948); H. G. Guthmann and H. E. Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy (New
York: Prentice-Hall, 1948); N. S. Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate Enter-
prise (New York: Henry Holt, 1940); and 0. P. Decker, Corporation Finance (New
York: American Institute of Banking, 1941).
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Yet it must be remembered that an optimum plan may call for sequen-
tial issuance of two types of securities, with a considerable time lag, and
that, because of the costs and the nuisance value of small issues, one form
of financing may be used exclusively even though the optimum plan also
calls for minor use of the other. Thus, in spite of the preponderance of
"corner solutions," the independence property may hold at least approxi-
mately; and, in fact, there are some indications that even in "corner solu-
tion" cases the optimum amount of new funds, according to our model,
would not be too greatly influenced by "tastes."
Quite obviously, what has been presented here is hardly more than the
beginning of the application of this type of analysis to an extremely com-
plex field. Other researchers could undoubtedly suggest several alternative
hypotheses for each that we have proposed, starting with the one based on
motivation of management and moving down the scale. We have become
especially aware of the inadequacy of the comparison of permanent equity
and permanent debt funds. For industrial corporations, at least, long-term
debt instruments seem to be an important source of funds that management
wishes to use for a few years only; common stock, of course, cannot be
used for this purpose because it cannot easily be retired. Nevertheless, once
we decided to investigate this complex problem, we felt that there was
some merit in making some sort of a start, rather than merely listing the
various alternatives and their shortcomings. We hope that, in the process,
we have suggested, or even contributed toward, some useful avenues of
investigation.
Iv
TESTING THE THEORETICAL MODEL
Since in the last analysis the real test of any theory is its ability to account
for the observed facts, an attempt was made to carry out statistical tests àf
certain implications of our model. These tests will be described in the
present section. To be sure, our model is far from complete at present; but
if we are moving in the right direction it should be able to account for
certain facts even at the present stage.
By its very nature our theory can only be tested against mass observa-
tions. Any theory based on simplifying assumptions cannot be expected to
explain all the "quirks" of all the individual decisions; it is only when these
idiosyncrasies have been averaged out by dealing with a substantial number
of cases that the influence of the basic factors upon which the theory is
based can become apparent. For this reason, and because of their avail-
ability, time series data seemed to be the appropriate type to use, in spite
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The difficulties presented by the available data are indeed formidable.
Some of them revolve around the nature of the data themselves and have
been discussed at length at this conference. But the problem of deriving,
from available data, statistical series that may reasonably be supposed to
measure our theoretical concepts is at least equally formidable. The main
difficulty centers on the problem of measuring expectation factors statis-
tically. This hurdle, in fact, prevented us from carrying out a direct test of
the full implications of our theoretical analysis. Such a test would have
required obtaining a measure of the anticipated yield on various amounts
of new capital; finding even an approximation to this schedule seems an
impossible task at present.
However our analysis does give us some hints as to the factors control-
ling the distribution of new financing between debt and equity forms, and
it was felt that an attempt might be made to approximate these factors, at
least crudely, by means of available statistical data.
The statistical analysis that follows deals, therefore, exclusively with
the factors accounting for the distribution of net corporate acquisitions of
new external long-term funds between their two main sources: the common
stock market and the long-term debt market. As a measure of .the distribu-
tion of funds between these two sources we may conveniently use the ratio
of the amount of new funds raised through issuance of common stock to
the amount raised through the issuance of both common stock and long-
term debt instruments. Estimates of the annual amount secured from each
source from 1920 to date are available in the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, though these estimates undoubtedly leave much to be desired.16
One particularly serious drawback in the use of the compiled figures
as presented in the Chronicle is that preferred and common stock issues
are separated only foraggregate of all corporations. To be sure, basic
data are supplied from which individual industry estimates of new capital
common stock issues could be computed. It seemed preferable, however,
to see what could be learned from the over-all aggregates before undertak-
ing the substantial amount of work involved in compiling industry esti-
mates. Accordingly we shall deal here only with the behavior of the
above-mentioned ratio for the entire corporate universe; this will be the
dependent variable whose behavior we intend to "explain."
Our theoretical analysis does not directly yield an expression relating
the above variable to market and expectation factors. We did find, however,
that under conditions of subjective certainty the relative advantage in the
use of equity as against debt funds would tend to be greater the smaller the
ratio of anticipated earnings gross of taxes to stock prices, relative to the
Forfurther information on the series used see Appendix B, ref. [1].282 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
interest rate. This same conclusion appeared to hold in the "uncertainty
model" also, but in this case another important variable appeared to be
the degree of risk, measured in our analysis by the dispersion of the sub-
jective distribution of anticipated gross earnings (i.e. gross of both interest
and taxes); ceteris paribus., the larger this dispersion the larger would tend
to be the incentive to the use of equity financing.'7
In order to carry out a statistical test of these conclusions we must face
the problem of how to measure the theoretically relevant variables. No
serious problem seems to arise with respect to the interest rate; we have at
our disposal an estimate of the interest yield on new bonds, which ought
to be a sufficiently good approximation to our theoretical concept and is
accordingly made use of.'8
A much more formidable problem is that of obtaining a satisfactory
measure of the earnings-price ratio since, according to our theoretical
analysis, earnings should refer to expected average long-term earnings,
gross of taxes, as seen by management: It is extremely doubtful that this
variable can be measured by the customary current-earnings/price ratio
even after an adjustment for corporate income taxes. An inspection of the
scatter diagram of Figure 2, which is based on this assumption, very much
reinforces such doubts. In this chart our dependent variable, denoted by
X,, is measured on the vertical axis while the relation between expected
earnings and the interest rate, as approximated by the quotient'9
Current Earnings/Price Ratio X Tax Adjustment Multiplier
Interest Yield on New Bonds
(denoted by Z1), is measured on the horizontal axis.2° The tax adjustment
factor is an estimate of the multiplier referred to in Subcase I-b, and is
made necessary by the fact that the available earnings-price ratio series
relate to earnings net of taxes. -
Onthe basis of the considerations developed above we should be led
to expect a negative correlation between the two variables. As a matter of
fact, it will be seen that large values of Z1 were generally accompanied by
relatively low values of X,. On the other hand, although low values of Zi
17Onthis point see Appendix C, Note 7.
See Appendix B, ref. [4].
methods and sources used in computing this variable see the definition of the
variable Z1inAppendix A and the references quoted there.
20Theyear 1933 was eliminated in this graph as in all the remaining graphs and all
the computations in this paper, since X1 for this year is seriously distorted as a result
of the repeal of Prohibition. Because the total issues in this year were very small, the
relatively large stock issues by breweries, malt manufacturers, etc., make the ratio
of stock financing to total financing unrepresentative.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 283
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wereaccompanied by relatively large values of X1 in such prosperous
years as 1928 and 1929, equally low or even lower values of Z1occurring
in years of severe depression (e.g., 1921, 1931, 1932) were accompanied
by a very low share of equity The reason for this phenomenon is
to be sought, we feel sure, in the unrepresentativeness of current earnings
as a measure of long-term earnings expectations.21 In years of exceptionally
low earnings, long-term earnings expectations are sure to be above current
earnings. Thus, even though stock prices may be high relative to current
earnings, this need not prove an incentive to equity financing; they may
still be, and are in fact likely to be, low relative to long-term earning
expectations.
This suggests that a more reasonable way of deriving' a measure of
expected average long-term earnings from the type of data we are now
considering would be to take an average of the earnings of several past
years. If, however, we take a simple average and include in it a number of
It may be noted in this connection that the removal of the tax adjustment factor
from Z1doesnot appreciably affect the general shape of the scatter.284 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
years sufficiently large to make the average meaningful, the resulting meas-
ure has the undesirable quality of "trailing." For example, during the
late twenties a long-period simple average tends to decline because the
very high earnings of the World War I years are being dropped from the
average. This, as well as other considerations, suggests that in forming such
an average the most recent experience should receive extra weight. Unf or-
tunately there is not much to guide us in the choice of a specific weighting
formula. We finally chose as our measure of expected earnings a ten-year
moving average of earnings gross of taxes in which the current year receives
roughly a third of the total weight.22 While this formula is admittedly quite
arbitrary, it should be remembered that variation in the weighting system
within reasonable limits does not, in general, affect the result significantly,
and this was confirmed in our case by some experiments that were carried
out.
We also made use of an entirely different measure of long-term earn-
ings expectations which does not involve an arbitrary weighting system,
though it suffers from shortcomings of its own: namely, the current divi-
dend yield (adjusted for taxes) •23 The use of this variable is suggested by
the apparently widespread tendency on the part of management to follow
a policy of dividend stabilization. To the extent that this tendency exists,
dividend rates would tend to be set at levels capable of being maintained
by anticipated future earnings (net of taxes).
Two serious shortcomings in this measure are worth mentioning. In the
first place, dividends are also affected by certain temporary factors —for
example, by the undistributed profits tax of 1936 and 1937. Secondly, this
measure may be expected to underestimate systematically anticipated total
earnings, since it only measures that portion of anticipated earnings which
management feels it is wise to distribute, on the average, over a period of
years. Neither of these difficulties however should reduce the representa-
tiveness of this series below the level of usefulness. The second shortcoming
in particular should still permit us to measure the movement of
earnings expectations, provided the above-mentioned portion remains
approximately constant in time. The absolute level and movements of this
series, however, cannot properly be made use of.
With one further remark we may conclude this discussion of empirical
equivalents to expectations data. Neither of our two tentative measures of
the behavior of long-term profit expectations can be considered really satis-
22Fordetails on the methods used see the definition of the variable Z2inAppendix A
and the references quoted there.
Forsources of data and the method of adjusting for taxes see the definition of the
variable Z3inAppendix A and the references quoted there.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 285
factory, but it may be hoped that they represent reasonably good first
approximations. This hope derives some slight support from the fact that
the behavior of our two measures turns out to be surprisingly similar and
the results of the statistical analysis were substantially the same with
either variable.
Having thus somehow settled the problem of measuring the group of
variables that were suggested by both the "certainty" and the "uncertainty"
model, we may turn to the problem of measuring the subjective uncertainty
surrounding the estimate of expected returns, which in our model was
represented by the dispersion of the subjective probability distribution of
anticipated This is again a variable which obviously cannot be
directly observed or measured and the best we can do is to try to secure a
reasonable approxImation. We felt there was some justification for attempt-
ing to measure this variable by means of the actual standard deviation of
profits over the recent past.
The reasoning underlying this measure is, briefly, that management's
subjective probability distribution is largely a reflection of its recent expe-
rience.24 The choice as to number of years that should be included in the
computation of this standard deviation is again pretty much in the nature
of a shot in the dark. However, having chosen a ten-year average in con-
nection with the problem of anticipated earnings, it appeared reasonable
to use the same span of time as a basis for computing the standard devia-
tion. Because we felt it was essential for the purpose of this computation
that we use earnings gross of interest and taxes, as indicated by our theo-
retical analysis, these computations were based primarily on Bureau of
Internal Revenuedata25 rather than on the type of data used in computing
the expected-earnings/price ratio.2e
The statistical equivalent of this statement may clarify the concept. Where profit
data for past years can reasonably be assumed to be a sample of the constant universe
of annual profit data, the near future may be thought of as another sample from this
universe. The problem of prediction then becomes one of estimating from the mean
and dispersion of one sample (past earnings) the mean of another sample from the
same population (mean earnings over soniè future span) and the dispersion of this
mean.
For further details on sources and methods of computation see the definition of the
variable X2 in Appendix A and the. references quoted there.
In computing the latter variable it was essential that the data on earnings (or divi-
dends) and on stock prices should refer to the very same sample. This was the reason
for using the type of sample data indicated in Appendix B, ref. [2]. These data,
however, refer to earnings net of both interest and taxes; while it was possible to
introduce some adjustment for taxes, there did not seem to be any simple way of
making an adjustment for interest payments. From B.I.R. data, on the other hand,
profits gross of both interest and taxes could be easily obtained for most years.286 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
One more problem that remains to be settled relates to the specific
form in which our variables should enter into the regression equation. Con-
siderations derived from our theoretical analysis suggested using the dif-
ference between the expected-earnings/price ratio and the interest rate
as one variable and the standard deviation of past profits adjusted for
the growth in outstanding equity as a second variable.27 This was precisely
the approach used when the expected earnings were approximated by the
average of past earnings; accordingly, our dependent variable X1 was
related to the two variables mentioned above, denoted respectively by
Z2andX2.
We get very little help from our theoretical analysis as to the specific
form of the relation between the three variables, except for information
relating to the expected sign of the partial derivatives. However, several
considerations, including examination of the data, lead us to the use of a
semi-logarithmic relation, the variable X1 being related to logarithms of
Z2andX2.
The relation between X1 and Z2 is shown graphically by the scatter
diagram of Figure 3. Clearly this scatter represents a vast improvement
over the corresponding scatter of Figure 2. This is confirmed by a correla-
tion of —.72 (as compared with a correlation in the order of zero for the
series of Figure 2), which is quite significant when account is taken of the
relatively large number of observations: twenty-nine. Unfortunately, the
introduction of log X2 as a third variable gave very disappointing results.
The partial correlation of X1 with this variable was very small and definitely
insignificant; furthermore, the regression coefficient was negative, con-
trary to what we should have expected.
In using dividend payments as a measure of expected earnings, a modi-
fication appeared necessary in the form of the first independent variable.
Because of the probable systematic downward bias in the dividend yield
as a measure of earnings expectations, mentioned earlier, we did not feel
justified in making use of the difference between the dividend yield and
the interest rate. Instead, as a measure of the relation between the interest
rate and the expected-earnings/price ratio as approximated by the divi-
dend yield, we used the ratio of the former to the latter variable; in prin-
ciple, with a ratio form, the correlation should not be too much affected by
the aforementioned bias. The resulting variable is denoted hereafter
byZ3.28
Tests were carried out with linear as well as semi-logarithmic forms
25Foran exact definition and for sources of data for the variable seeAppendix A
and the references quoted there.
See Note 7, Appendix C.with very similar results. In the first casewas related to Z3andX2. Once
more we found a significant correlation between the first two variables
(.56;0the correlation is now positive because of the form of the variable
Zfl),butthe partial correlation with X2 was again insignificant. In the
second case X1 was related to log Z3andto the, -square Of this variable,
which again yielded a significant correlation (.61); but no significant
results were obtained for X2.
The analysis carried out thus far, then, presents fairly clear evidence
of the influence of the "cost" variable suggested by both the "certainty"
and the "uncertainty" analysis; on the other hand, these rests fail to support
our conclusion concerning the influence of the "uncertainty" variable. It is
difficult, however, to tell whether this is due to a failure of our theoretical
construct, or, as seems more likely, to our inability thuis far to secure a
valid measure of the theoretically relevant concept. It may be that manage-
ments' estimate of risk is not formed on the basis of recent past experience,
or that the data we have are too inaccurate actually to measure past expe-
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rience. In spite of our present failure we feel that further research in this
field should prove fruitful.
In addition to testing the influence of the variables directly suggested
by our theoretical analysis of rational behavior, we also conducted a
number of tests to ascertain the possible influence on our dependent vari-
able of a number of factors that have been suggested by other students or
which are suggested by empirical observations.
A variable that has elicited much interest recently is the debt-equity
ratio.2° The difficulties in accurately measuring this ratio are numerous
and have been dwelt upon at great length at this conference. In spite of the
inadequacy of the data, however, we decided to make some attempt at
including it in our empirical tests.3° Perhaps because of the inadequacy of
the measure, or because management does not think of equity in terms of
its book value, this variable was not of any help in explaining the distribu-
tion of new financing between debt and equity forms. Its year-to-year
movements are minor and, by and large, in the wrong direction. Our debt-
equity ratio is lower in the late forties, when relatively little stock financing
was done, than in the late twenties; and it is higher in the mid-thirties than
in the mid-twenties, though the proportion of new financing in the form of
stocks is approximately the same in the two periods.
As a result of interview data, several writers have suggested that the
ratio of the market value to the book value of equity is an important deter-
mining factor in bond-stock financing decisions.31 An examination of
Itshould be noted that the influence of the debt-equity ratio has already been taken
into account in our analysis insofar as the amount of debt determines the size of
prior claims on earnings, i.e., the interest burden. For, other things being equal, the
larger the proportion of debt in the capital structure the smaller will tend to be the
ratio of the numerator to the denominator of (7.1) or (7.2) given in Note 7,
Appendix C.
For our debt series we used E. T. Bonnell's compilation of long-term debt in
Survey of Current Business, October 1949, p. 8. Short-term debt was not included
because of its trade debt component. Rises in trade debt are offset by rises in trade
receivables and we felt that it should therefore not be included in the debt-equity ratio.
Our equity series was based on the Bureau of Internal Revenue data published in
the Statistics of Income for 1944, Part II, pp. 406-9; in Press Release S-782 (July 9,
1948), Table 3, p. 17, and S-1051 (April 21, 1949) Table 3, p. 17; and as computed
and listed in Martin Taitel, Profits, Productive Activities, and New Investment
(T.N.E.C., Monograph No. 12, 1941), Appendix I, pp. 138-42. A somewhat over-
simplified, but necessary, adjustment was introduced on the basis .of retained earn-
ings and new external funds in order to make the data for years when consolidated
returns were permitted comparable to the data based on unconsolidated returns. The
data were extrapolated to 1947-49 on the basis of sources and uses of funds data
published by the Department of Commerce.
See, for example, the comments by Dan T. Smith delivered at this conference.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 289
scatter diagrams utilizing our version of this ratio, however, convinced
us that the weak influence this factor seems to exert would work in a direc-
tion that is contrary to the one postulated.32
A "dynamic" factor not directly suggested by our essentially static
analysis, but one that may be supposed to exert some influence on the dis-
tribution of new financing between debt and equity forms did turn out to
be of considerable importance. This factor was the relation of the level of
current stock prices to the level prevailing in the recent past. The rationale
of introducing this factor is that even when the differential between cost
factors is not too favorable to stock financing, if stock prices are high
relative to their recent levels, a sort of historical relative advantage may be
achieved which may encourage stock financing; and vice versa. In other
words, the introduction of this price variable implies an "if-I'm-ever-going-
to-do-it-now-is-the-time" of thinking on the part of management.
For purposes of statistical testing this variable was measured by. the
ratio of current stock prices to the average level of stock prices in the pre-
vious five years; it is denoted hereafter by X3.33 The statistical results
obtained by using this variable in addition to the one measuring the relation
between the earnings-price ratio and the interest rate are given below:84
I.Long-term earnings expectations measured by an average of past
earnings:
Regression Equation I:X1=.14—.15 (logZ2) +.13X3
• (.04) (.046)
Multiple Correlation I:.80
II.Long-term earnings expectations measured by current dividend pay-
ments:
Regression Equation hA: X1 =—.17+ .18 Z3 + .20 X3
(.05) (.05)
Multiple Correlation hA: .78
Regression Equation JIB:
X1=—.01 +.43 (logZ3) +.72
(.13) (.28) (.04)
Multiple Correlation JIB: .81
All computations were based on the years 1920 through 1949 but do not
Forthe sources of data used to compute book value, see footnote 30 above. For
the market value, see the definition of the variable X2, Appendix A, and the sources
quoted there.
For methods and sources used in computing this variable see Appendix A and the
references quoted there.
The addition of our measure of dispersionas an additional independent variable
again gave insignificant results which are therefore not presented here.290 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
include The figures given in parentheses below the regression
coefficients are the standard errors of the corresponding coefficient.
These results are fairly satisfactory. All regression coefficients have
the expected signs and are quite significant by the customary statistical
tests.36 Furthermore, the two independent variables are seen to account
for a substantial proportion of the variation of X1. It may also be noted that
there is substantial agreement between the results obtained with either of
our two measures of expected profits, though the contributions of the rate
of change of prices (X3) appears somewhat greater with the use of divi-
dends (Equations II) than with the use of past- earnings (Equation I).
This similarity of the results is also confirmed by a comparison of the
residuals, which are presented for Equations I and II B in the two panels
of Figure 4.
Before concluding, afewwords about the over-all meaning of the rela-
tionships tested are in order. In this type of analysis it is always pertinent
to ask whether the observed joint distribution of the variables represents a
demand curve, a supply curve, or the intersection "points" of demand
and supply curves. We have strong reasons to suppose that the relation-
ships exhibited above do represent the demand function for funds on the
part of the corporate sector, as we have assumed, since, 'to a decision-maker
dealing only with new financing, all the elements of the cost factors can
reasonably be assumed to be fixed and not influenced by his actions. The
corporate income tax rate is a governmentally fixed parameter. Manage-
ment's estimate of anticipated per share earnings is assumed to be primarily
based on past data. The interest rate on all corporate bonds is strongly
affected by the actions of the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve
System. However, even if the influence of these governmental agencies
were weak, the interest rate on new bonds can still be considered to be
"given" since this rate is determined in a market where new bonds consti-
tute only a small proportion of the total amount of bonds traded. Simi-
larly, the issue price of new stock is determined in the market for all
outstanding stock, of which it forms only a minor part. Thus, the indepen-
dent variables used in explaining the common stock to common-stock-
plus-long-term-debt new issues variable, may reasonably be considered to
be parameters of action to which financial management adjusts.
By way of conclusion we should like to stress once more that the statis-
tical analysis presented above should be considered as a mere beginning.
As such it may be regarded as fairly promising. In particular, the influence
The reason for omitting 1933wasexplained in footnote 20 above. -
Allcoefficients are significant at the 1 percent level or better except the coefficient
of (log Z3) in Equation II B, which barely fails to reach this level.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 291
Figure 4
THE COMPONENTS OF EQUATIONS I AND II B AND A COMPARISON
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of the relation between the expected-earnings/price ratio and the interest
rate on the share of equity financing, which was suggested by the theoretical
analysis, receives fairly clear support. While it is true that the use of this
variable, supplemented by the rate of change of prices, still failed to
account for a non-negligible proportion of the fluctuations of the dependent
variable, it should be remembered that, according to our tests, none of the
other factors which have most frequently been suggested appear to be of
any real relevance.
For further research in this field the development of more reliable and
suitable basic data should be placed very high on the agenda. As such data
become available it will be possible to retest our results and to improve
the statistical analysis. In place of the over-all aggregates we have used
it would be particularly useful to substitute more homogeneous series on
new capital flotations, measuring the new financing of smaller industry
groups. The work now being completed at the Nati6nal Bureau will pro-
vide a more accurate series on net debt issues with which to retest our
conclusions.
On the anticipated earnings side, much still remains to be done. Per-
haps, eventually, a series based on questionnaires may become available.
Of course, such a series would itself have to be tested for accuracy, but it
should certainly be given a trial. Also, as more is learned about the forma-
tion of expectations, more accurate use of historical data may become
possible.
Although, as mentioned earlier in the paper, this type of analysis can
only be tested by means of mass observations, this does not bar a test that
utilizes data of a cross section of firms within a given industry group over
a shorter period of time. The difficulties involved in such a project are
great, and the assembled data meager; nevertheless, further tests using this
type of data would seem to be worth the effort involved.
On the negative side, we can only view with disappointment our abor-
tive attempt at including a measure of uncertainty in the tests. Nevertheless,
we still feel that considerations of risk are important and that further tests
should attempt to include other measures of this concept. In this connection
again, questionnaire data may be a useful means of discovering more
reasonable measures.
We may conclude much as we began. The theoretical as well as the
statistical analysis presented in th.is paper is really only a beginning. As
the analysis is broadened to include other types of financing, and to take
into account other factors, some of which have been mentioned at various
places in this paper, several revisions and substantial additions will have
to be made. In the process it may be hoped we will come to understand
more fully the influence of financial factors on investment decisions.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 293
APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES USED IN THE STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF SECTION IV
The number in brackets after each series refers to the number in Appendix
B which precedes the source of the series. The variables are listed in the
order in which they appear in the text.
Common-Stock New Capital Issues [1]
Common-Stock plus Long-Term-Debt New Capital Issues [1]
This series is reproduced in Column 1 of Appendix Table A.
Current-Earnings/Price Ratio [2](1—MarginalTax Rate) [3]
Interest Yield on New Bonds [4]
Z2:
.075 Eet_j+.25
(1Tt—,) 1 —InterestYield on New Bonds [4] Index of Current Stock Prices [2]
t: current year
Ct—earnings per share [2]
Tt—average corporate tax burden [5]
This series is reproduced in Column 2 of Appendix Table A.
Interest Yield on New Bonds [4]
Current Dividend Yield [2] ± (1 — Marginal Tax Rate) [3]
This series is reproduced in Column 3 of Appendix Table A.
Standard Deviation of Gross Corporate Earnings
in the Latest Ten Years [6]
2. Market Value of Shares Listed on the New York
Stock Exchange in Current Year [7]




P: annual index of commonstock prices [8]
This series is reproduced in Column 5 of Appendix Table A.294 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
Table A
STATISTICAL SERIES USED IN SECTION IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year X1 Z3 X2 X3
1920 .33 6.37 1.041 .116 .93
1921 .13 5.14 1.000 .153 .81
1922 .15 5.49 .952 .112 1.06
1923 .15 6.74 .901 .108 1.08
1924 .21 6.51 .893 .087 1.11
1925 .20 5.60 .962 .080 1.36
1926 .18 4.45 .909 .073 1.41
1927 .15 2.71 .971 .058 1.48
1928 .35 1.39 1.162 .051 1.67
1929 .57 .17 1.369 .046 1.79
1930 .29 .99 1.063 .052 1.16
1931 .17 3.65 .758 .082 .67
1932 .04 8.51 .741 .214 .35
1933 a a a a a
1934 .21 4.35 1.111 .161 .66
1935 .06 4.47 .885 .142 .92
1936 .23 2.71 .719 .097 1.56
1937 .21 2.77 .625 .094 1.49
1938 .02 3.50 .662 .110 .96
1939 .20 4.59 .595 .080 .98
1940 .11 -5.11 .422 .090 .88
1941 .08 8.71 .339 .128 .79
1942 .04 12.04 .289 .181 .74
1943 .13 9.31. .415 .168 1.09
1944 .16 9.72 .385 .164 .1.18
1945 .27 8.15 .429 .130 1.42
1946 .26 7.33 .431 .112 1.51
1947 .15 10.46 .345 .132 . 1.18
1948 .09 12.47 .342 .123 1.08
1949 .13 13.48 .278 .102 1.00
1933has been omitted from all computations. See footnote 20 above.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 295:
APPENDIXB
SOURCES OF DATA USED IN THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, OF SECTION IV
[1]Common-Stock and Long-Term-Debt New Capital Issues:
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Table on "Capital Flotations for
the Year," annual volumes. Data are annual totals and include all indus-
tries except investment trusts, holding companies, etc.
[2]Earnings, Dividend,,and Price Data:
1911 through 1937: Cowles Commission Monograph No. 3, Common
Stock Indexes (Bloomington: Principia Press, 1940). The earnings-
price ratios are found in Table R-1, the earnings per share series is
found in Table E-1, the dividend yields are found in Table and
the price'series is found in Table P-i.
1938 through 1948: Moody's Investors Service, Industrial Manual,
1949, p. a20. In computing the ten-year moving average of earnings
per share (see numerator of first term of Z9) for the years 1938 through
1949 Moody's data from 1929 on were used.
1949: Moody's Investors Service, current releases.
[3]Marginal Tax Rate:
National Industrial Conference Board, Economic Almanac for 1949,
pp. 146-49. The highest bracket marginal tax rate was used throughout
since we are dealing largely with corporations to, which this rate applies.
[4]Interest Yield on New Bonds:
Moody's Investors Service, Industrial Manual, 1949, p. a17. For 1920
and 1949 the yield on new bonds was not available; the composite yield
on all bonds was used instead.
[5]Aver,age Corporate Income Tax Burden:*
1920 through 1922: B.I.R. "Total Taxes" divided by B.I.R. "Net
Income"; S. of 1., 1944, Part II, p. 372.
1923 through 1928: B.I.R. "Total Taxes" (S. of 1., 1944, Part II, p.
372) divided by B.I.R. "Compiled Net Profits" (S. of I. for 1923
through 1925, annual volumes; for other years, 1944, Part II, pp.
376 if.).
1929 and 1934 through 1946: D. of C. "Corporate Tax Liability"
(S.C.B. National Income Supplement, July 1947, p. 30, and National
Income Issue, July 1950, p. 17) divided by B.I.R. "Compiled Net
*Theabbreviations used in [5]through[8] have the following meanings: B.I.R.,
Bureau of Internal Revenue; S. of1., Statistics of income;D. of C., Department of
Commerce; S.C.B., Survey of Current Business.296 RESEARCH TN BUSINESS FINANCE
Profits" (S. of 1., 1944, Part II, pp. 376 if.; and Press Releases S-782,
July 9, 1948, and S-1051, April 21, 1949). The shift from B.I.R. to
D. of C. data for the estimate of tax liability was suggested by the in-
creasing importance of state income taxes. However, it was thought
preferable to use the B.I.R. profits series as far as available as it is likely
toa better approximation to profits as seen by management.
1947 through 1949: D. of C. "Corporate Tax Liability" (S.C.B. Na-
tional Income Supplement, July 1947, p. 30, and National Income
Issue, July 1950, p. 17) to D. of C. "Corporate Income before Taxes"
(S.C.B., July 1950, p. 17).
1931 through 1933: No ratio representing the tax burden was com-
puted for these years because of negative profits (i.e. losses). The
following adjustment based on the year 1929 was used instead:
The Cowles Commission figure for earnings per share in 1929 is
approximately $1.60 less than the figure we get by correcting for taxes.
According to the Department of Commerce, total tax liability in 1929
was $1.4 billion. This indicates that a $1 billion total tax liability is
equivalent to $1.15 tax liability per share. For each of the years 1931,
1932, and 1933, therefore, the Department of Commerce tax liability
was multiplied by $1.15 per billion dollars and this amount was added
to the Cowles Commission earnings per share figure. The adjustments
were: 1931, $.56; 1932, $.45; 1933, $.56. Carrying this adjustment on
to 1934 and 1935 would have given adjustments of $.79 and $1.13
respectively. Using the direct tax burden the adjustments are $.88 and
$.90 respectively.
The same procedure was used to compute the 1931, 1932, and 1933
tax correction adjustment for use with Moody's data. The coefficient in
this case was $.478 per billion dollars of tax liability and the adjust-
ments were: 1931, $.24; 1932, $.19; 1933, $.25.
[6]Corporate Earnings Gross of Interest and Taxes:
The sum of two series: 1) Net Profits before Taxes and 2) Corporate
Interest Payments.
Net Profits before Taxes:
1910 through 1922: The B.I.R. "Net Income" series was adjusted to
make it comparable to the B.I.R. "Compiled Net Profits" series (see
[5] above) on the basis of the relation between these two series for the
next few subsequent years. Specifically, the "Net 'Income" series was
divided by .9 in each of the years 1910 through 1919, by .85 in 1920
and 1921, and by .83 in 1922. This adjustment is obviously no more
than a rough guess but this need not be serious in view of the relatively
small size of the adjustment and of the fact that the yearly data were
used only to compute a ten-year standard deviation and not individually.
1923 through 1946: B.I.R. "Compiled Net Profits" (see [5] above).EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 297
1947 through 1949: D. of C. "Corporate Income before Taxes" (see
[5] above).
Corporate Interest Payments:
1910 through 1916: A graphical extrapolation of the B.LR.
Paid" series based on W. I. King's "Net Interest on Funded Debt Paid
to Individuals," found in his The National Income and Its Purchasing
Power (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1930) p. 186.
1917 through 1946: B.I.R. "Interest Paid" series (S. of 1., 1944, p. 372
and Press Releases cited above).
1947 through 1949: D. of C. "Interest Payments" for all industries.
[7]Market Value of All Shares Listed on the New York Stock
Exchange:
S.C.B., March 1950, p. S-20, and Statistical Supplements, 1932, 1938,
and 1949, pp. 104, 76, and 104 respectively. This series is only available
from 1925 to date. Values for the years 1920 through 1923 were esti-
mated by graphical extrapolation, using the Cowles Commission stock
indexes (Monograph No. 3, Common Stock Indexes, Table P-i) as
follows (in billions of dollars): 1920, 22.0; 1921, 18.0; 1922, 23.5;
1923, 24.0. For 1924 the figure for January 1, 1925 was used.
[8]Average Annual Stock Prices:
1915 through 1917: Cowles Commission Price Index (see [7] above).
1918 through 1949: Standard and Poor's Index, reprinted in S.C.B.,
March 1950, p. S-20, and Statistical Supplements, 1938 and 1949, pp.
77 and 104 respectively.
APPENDIX C
NOTE 1
For use in this paper (except as noted at the appropriate places) we define
the symbols as follows:
IT =theanticipated net, long-run, average, yearly return to existing
stockholders, net of interest and of corporate income taxes.
H0 =theanticipated net, long-run, average, yearly return to stock-
holders if no new capital is acquired, net of interest and of cor-
porate income taxes.
B =theamount of new capital to be raised through sale of debt
instruments.
S =theamount of new capital to be raised through sale of common
stock.298 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
F =B+ Sthe total amount of new capitall to be raised.
Y =Y(F)=theanticipated long-run, average, yearly return on new
capital, gross of interest and of corporate income taxes.
p =p(F)=dY(F)/dF.
r =theeffective current interest rate on debt funds (includes allow-
ances for premium or discount and costs of flotation or place-
ment).
P =thecurrent per share net proceeds obtainable through sale of
common stock (includes allowance for costs of flotation).
n =thenumber of "old"shares of common stock outstanding.
=theanticipated effective corporate income tax rate.(Strictly
speaking, our analysis applies only to a situation in which the
expected tax rate is constant and in which the tax laws allow full
carry-forward and carry-back privileges over the period of the
estimate.)
a= (1—T).
Thefollowing remarks concerning these definitions may be made:
1)is defined net of interest and taxes because this corresponds to the
form in which much of the empirical data are found. Y(F) is defined gross
of these items because the amount of these charges depends on the type
of financing employed. Using our previous definitions, the anticipated
long-run mean return to stockholders if no new capital is acquired, net of
interest, but gross of corporate income taxes is Ho/a.
2) To conserve space, the following proofs include corporate income tax
considerations. Proofs of the conclusions set forth in Subcase I-a in the
text may be obtained by merely setting T =0,a =1.
3) With few exceptions, which are clearly indicated, the analysis has been
limited to cases where
(1.0)
F, B, S,can be given definite meaning,
their inclusion in the analysis complicates it considerably while yielding
conclusions that are strikingly similar to the ones exhibited. In particular,
complications are encountered because the Y(F) function may be discon-
tinuous at F =0,and because the latitude to retire common stock allowed
management by the courts differs so greatly in different jurisdictions.
If the only financing instrument used is bonds, acquiring and investing
a "lump" sum B will increase the "return" to existing stockholders if




Again considering bonds to be the only financial instrument used, the
"return" to existing stockholders in the continuous case is given by
(1.3) ir=110+a[Y(F)—Br] with F=B
and the condition for this "return" to be maximized is given by
(1.4) -
dp(F) i.e., p(F) =rprovideddF<0
The optimum value of B in this case is therefore F*, where F* is the
value of F satisfying (1.4). F* will be positive only if
(1.5) p(O) > r
If condition (1.5) does not hold, F* will be zero because of (1.0). If
we drop this latter condition the optimum plan may call for no change in
amount of bonds outstanding or the repayment of debt by means of a
reduction in assets. The first is highly likely in view of the discontinuity of
the Y(F) function at F =0.If the second is called for, the amount of
repayment will depend on the volume of bonds outstanding. In either case
the optimum plan may not fulfill condition (1.4).
NOTE 2
With the symbols defined as in Note 1, if common stock is the only
financing instrument available, acquiring and investing a sum" will
increase the "return" to existing stockholders if:
(21)




Again considering common stock to be the only financial instrument
used, the "return" to existing stockholders in the continuous case is
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(2.3) [llo+aY(F)]withFS
and the condition for this return to be a maximum is given by
'24) —
F —o




The optimum value of S in this case is therefore F° where F°isthe value
of F satisfying (2.4).F°will be positive only if
(2.5) p(O) >Ho/a
If condition (2.5) does not hold, the optimum value of S will be zero
because of (1.0). If we drop this latter condition, the optimum financing
plan may call for no change in the outstanding stock or for repurchase of
outstanding stock by means of a reduction in the assets. The stringency of
legal rules governing repurchase of stock as well as the discontinuity in the
Y(F) function at F =0makes the former the more likely solution. In
either case the optimum plan may not satisfy condition (2.4).
NOTE 3
If both bonds and stocks are eligible financing instruments, the earnings
accruing to existing stockholders are given by:
(3.1) ir= Ho+a[Y(F)—Br]
fl+75
andthe problem is to maximizesubject to condition (1.0) of Note 1.
The usual first oider maximum conditions yield the equations:
an




Suppose, now, equation (3.2) is satisfied by F =F*> 0 (the condition
for which is given by (1.5), Note 1). Substituting in (3.3) F* for F, r for
p(F*), and (F* —S)for B, we obtains, the change in existing stock-
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financing plan to acquire a total of F* dollars. We then find that the
dir> derivative 0 depending on whether
> Ho/a+Y(F*)_F*r (.)
anexpression that does not depend on S. Suppose, first, that (3.4) takes the
"less than" sign; thenis negative for any value S and old stockholders'
profits will be maximized when S has the smallest value consistent with our
problem which by condition (1.0) is
(3.5) S =0,and therefore BFF*
In this case, then, the optimum financial plan involves only bonds, and
the optimum amount of bonds is given by (3.5) and (3.2). At the same
time equation (3.3) will not be satisfied since S cannot be negative.
If (3.4) takes the "greater than" sign, existing stockholders' profits
increase continuously with S, within the range 0SF*. The greatest
value of ir within this range must be reached when SF*,B0. But at
this point is still positive and earnings can be further increased by
increasing S. As long as B is to be non-negative (condition 1.0) this means
increasing F itself beyond F* (since if S> F* and B0 then FS +
B > F*). But from (3.2) we see that this implies< 0, so that in this
case profits will be maximized by making B as small as possible; because
of condition (1.0) this means B0. The optimum value of SF° can
then be found by maximizing (3.1) with respect to S, with B0, which
again yields condition (2.4). The solution will have the properties:
(3.6)
A brief word about the effects on these conclusions of relaxing condi-
tion (1.0) may be in order, in spite of the fact that negative values of F, S,
B are unlikely to be eligible for the practical reasons of discoñtinuities
at 0 and of institutional restrictions. It is possible that the formal optimum
financing plan may involve liquidation of part of the assets of the firm and
repayment of outstanding bonds and/or purchase by the corporation of
part of its outstanding stock. Under other conditions, the formal optimum
plan may call for an issue of stock (bonds) not only large enough to
increase the size of the firm, but also to refinance part of the outstanding
bonds (stock)
It is interesting to examine the relationship that the above analysis
implies between the effective interest rate and the original-earnings/price302 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
ratio. As long as condition (1.5) holds, positive financing is in order and
will increase earnings per share, and therefore the right hand side of (3.4)
will be larger thanHo/a
This implies that if r<
h10/a
necessarily<0,
but if this inequality is reversedmay still remain negative.
dS
NOTE 4
In Note 1, interpret all symbols having to do with "returns" as denoting
expected, rather than anticipated, "returns" and in addition let:
o =0 +Y(F)]=ameasure of the dispersion of the a subjective probability distribution
-ofoutcomes
11*='y + Y(F)1 =fl*(F) =thecertainty equivalent a Jof an outcome having an expected
value+ Y(F), and a disper-
In general, y need not be a constant but may be considered a function
of Y, which in turn is a function of F, such that




Then the "certainty equivalent earnings" accruing to existing stock-
holders, 7r*, is given by:
(43) =
Proceeding in a manner similar to the one followed in Notes 1, 2, and 3, we.
find that the condition for positive bond financing is
(4.4) >
which is more stringent than condition (1.5), Note 1, because of (4.2);
and the condition for positive stock financing isEFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 303
(45) (0) >y(11o/a)/(nP)
p y'(Ho/a)
which, if anticipated and expected values are equal, is more stringent than
(2.5), Note 2, if as is usual the marginal risk and the marginal rate at which
it is discounted are greater than the respective averages.
Let F* *bethe value of F> 0 which maximizes return to old stock-
holders with respect to bonds alone, i.e., let F** satisfy
(4.6)
H




where the "greater than" sign indicates that stock financing is preferable.
By comparing this condition to condition (3.4), Note 3, it can be seen that
if expected value equals anticipated value, the range of market "prices"
for which. equity financing will be preferable is widened by taking uncer-
tainty and risk aversion into account, since clearly




Let ir denote the "expected," future, average, yearly, net return to existing
stockholders. This may be thought of as the arithmetic mean of the distri-
bution of anticipated actual earnings, or, as any other measure of central
tendency having (at least approximately) the property that if K1 and K2
are constant, "expected" (K1X + K2Y) =K1("expected"X) + K2("ex-
pected" Y).
Let denote the dispersion of the distribution of anticipated net
earnings of existing stockholders; it measures the extent to which the actual
outcome is considered capable of deviating from the "expected" outcome.
may be thought of as the standard deviation of the distribution, or any
other measure of dispersion having the property (at least approximately)
that ifis the dispersion of X, and K is a constant, the dispersion of
Similarly we denote by Ho/a the "expected" total earnings to the304 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
existing stockholders (gross of taxes but net of interest) if no new financing
is undertaken; by Y (F) the "expected" additional earnings before interest
and taxes that would result by investing a fresh amount F in the firm; by
p(F) the derivativedY(F)
and by=(F) the dispersion of total
gross earnings (before interest and taxes). is of course the disper-
sion of earnings if no new financing is undertaken and corresponds to the
expected return Ho/a. The remaining symbols have the same meaning as
in Note 1.




For (5.1) and (5.2) to hold exactly, we must assume not only corporate
income taxes proportional to income but also provision for offsetting of
profits against losses, for tax purposes.
The problem is to choose S and B so as to maximize the assumed
utility function
(5.4) u =u(ir, with u1 > 0, u2
subjectto restrictions (5.1) and (5.2). Introducing the Lagrangian multi-




withrespect to ir,1.77-, B, and S. Differentiating and setting the first deriva-
five equal to zero we obtain, as first order maximum conditions,
(5.5) u1—A=0
(5.6)





Simultaneous solution of the equations (5.1), (5.2), and (5.5) to (5.8)
yields the values of S. B, n-, maximizing (5.4), provided the second
order conditions are satisfied.
To bring out more clearly the implications of this solution, as stated




Eliminating the Lagrangian multipliers, the conditions (5.5) to (5.8) can
now be reduced to the following two:
—u2Ho/a+Y(F)—(nP+F)r
•/ u1 —
510 Ho/a+ Y(F) —(nP+F)r—p(F)—r
o11(F) — do-11
dF
It will be noted that equation (5.10) has the following properties:
(a) It does not involve B and S separately, but only their sum, F, i.e., total
new financing; and since it involves no other variables but F, it is in general
sufficient to determine the optimum value of this variable.
(b) It does not involve in any way the parameters of the preference
function, u.
Thus (disregarding for the moment certain problems raised by bound-
ary conditions)itis seen that the optimum amount of financing is
determined independently of the specific risk preference function of man-
agement and depends exclusivelythe "data" of the problem, i.e., the
market data and the "expectation of return" parameters. As for equation
(5.9), it may be easily shown that the right hand side expression measures
the slope of the "market opportunity" relation between ir and con-
fronting management for any given amount of total new financing, F. To
prove this we first replace B in equation (5.1) by the expression F —
andthen eliminate S between (5.1) and (5.2) which can be done very
easily thanks to the form of these two equations. This yields the equation:
— Ho/a± Y(F) nP) (5.11)
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Equation (5.11) represents the market opportunity function corresponding
to any given value of F, i.e., the set of pairs of ir and thatare open to
management under the given market and expectations data. Any point on
this line can be achieved by a proper distribution of F between B and S
[the specific value of S and B corresponding to a given ir,and F can
of course be found from (5.2) and (5.3) above]. It will be seen that for
any given F this opportunity function is a straight line and its slopedir
doIT
is precisely equal to the right hand side of (5.9). Furthermore, the oppor-
tunity lines corresponding to different values of F represent a system of
straight lines in the ir, crir plane all going through the point (0, amP).
Because of this property it is clear that the "best" opportunity line
within this set must be the steepest one; for this line will yield the largest
ir for any Thusthe best line can be found by differentiating the
slope of (5.11) with respect to F [or, which is equivalent, differentiating
(5.11) partially with respect to F] and setting the derivative equal to zero
(first order condition). It is easily verified that the resulting condition is
equivalent to (5.10). This helps clarify the reason why the optimum amount
of net new financing is independent of the risk preference function. The
risk preference function only determines which point will be chosen on this
"best" opportunity line; and thus also the distribution of F between B
and S. The chosen point will be a point of tangency of an indifference curve
with the "best" line, as indicated by (5.9), after the variable F on its right
hand side is replaced by the specific value given by the solution to (5.10).
From the derivative of the slope of the opportunity lines with respect
to F at F =0,it is possible to note the condition under which any net posi-
tive financing will be advisable. Specifically it turns out that the derivative




Thestatement in the text is derived from this expression.
Equation (5.10) has other interesting properties. The right hand side
measures the slope of the "bonds-only boundary curve," discussed in the
text, Subcase IT-c. This curve is defined as the locus of the IT,combina-
tions that are achievable by using bonds only as the instrument of financing.
To verify this statement it is only necessary to substitute BF, S =0
into (5.1) and (5.2), differentiate each resulting equation with respect to F,
and form the derivative fromand
dEin the usual manner.
It follows directly from this that the bonds-only boundary curve is tangent
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It is also possible to show that the boundary curve representing the
ii-,combinations attainable with B =±B0, S =FB0 (where B0 is
any fixed amount of bonds) is also tangent to the "best" opportunity line.
For, the value of F for which (5:10) holds, i.e.,for which the slope of the
"best" opportunity line is equal to the slope of the bonds-only boundary
curve, is also the value of F for which the slope of the B =±B0,
S =FB0 boundary is equal to the slope of the bonds-only boundary.
To find the expression for the slope of the B =±B0, S =FB0 boundary
the reader may substitute these values into (5.1) and (5.2) and proceed as
for the slope of the bonds-only boundary. The reader may then prove the
equality-of-slopes statement made above by multiplying the numerator
of each side of (5.10) by—i, adding to and subtracting from the numerator
on the left hand side the factor [p(FM) (nP + FMB0) ± Bor] (where
FM is the value of F for which (5.10) holds), and rearranging terms.
It will be noted that the solution will be a "corner" solution, if and
only if the value of F being positive, the value of either B or S is zero or
negative. It is clear that such solutions are possible but that they are not
the only possible type of solutions.
NOTE 6
Since the maximizing value of F is given by equation (5.10), the effect of
variation in the price on F can be found by differentiating this equation




p[Ho/a+ Y(F) —(nP+ F)r]
dF2
The numerator of this expression may generally be assumed negative; as
to the denominator, it must be negative if the second
order maximum conditions are satisfied. Indeed, these conditions imply
(62' d2(Ho/a+Y(F)—(nP+F)r
/ dF2 k
which,taking into account the first order maximum condition, reduces
precisely to the condition that the denominator of (6.1) be negative. It
follows that dF/dP will generally be positive, i.e., total financing will tend
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NOTE 7
The rationale underlying the use of these variables deserves a brief expla-
nation at this point. It is based onnotion that the relative advantage
in the use of equity versus debt funds depends (at least approximately)
on the slope of what we have previously called the "best opportunity line"
(Section II, page 272). As was shown in Note 5, the slope of this line is
represented by the right hand side of equation (5.9), after we replace F in
this expression by the optimum amount of new financing. Clearly, the slope
of this line depends partly on the "productivity of new capital" function,
Y(F), which, as indicated previously, we feel unable at present to approxi-
mate by means of available data. We do feel, however, that the various
measures discussed in the text may represent a reasonable approximation
to the relevant parameters of the distribution of anticipated returns on
existing assets, even though they are likely to represent a rather poor mea-
sure of the anticipated productivity of varying amounts of new capital.
Now the slope of (5.9) depends on the parameters of the distribution
of anticipated earnings on all assets, i.e., existing assets as well as contem-
plated additions to these assets. However, net new financing, F, and its
anticipated earning power, Y(F), are bound to represent a relatively small
fraction of already invested capital and its earning power. Accordingly,
the slope of the best opportunity line should tend to be closely approxi-
mated by the slope of the zero net financing line obtained by setting F0
in the right hand side of (5.9). This slope then becomes:
(7.1) l1o/a—nrP
which may also be rewritten as:
(7.2) 110a—r
It will now be recognized that the two independent variables suggested in
the text represent a measure respectively of the numerator and denominator
of (7.2) and therefore an approximation to the numerator and denomi-
nator of (5.9). The closeness of this approximation is, of course, improved
to the extent that our variables also measure anticipations relating to the
productivity of new capital.
It should be noted that the expression in the denominator of (7.2)
consists of the dispersion of anticipated earnings divided by the market
value of the outstanding common stock. Since the dispersion of anticipated
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ingsof all corporations, this variable should properly be divided by the ag-
gregate market value of all common stock. Estimates of the latter variable
•are not available, however; as a substitute we were forced to use a variable
that should be roughly proportional to it, namely, the market value of all
common stock issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange. On this
point see the definition of the variable X2 in Appendix A and the reference
quoted there.
It may be added that the use of the variables appearing in (7.2) rather
than in (7i) was dictated by the nature of the available data. As indicated
in Appendix B ref. [2] we do not have a series on earnings per share and
corresponding stock prices covering the entire period and we were there-
fore forced to shift from one source to another in 1937. The ratios of
earnings per share to stock prices from the two sources agree fairly well
over the overlapping period but the actual level of the two component
series is quite different since they are based on different samples. This made
it advisable to make use of variables involving the ratio of earnings to
prices, as in the numerator of (7.2), rather than the expression in the
numerator of (7.1).
DISCUSSION:
LAWRENCE R. KLEIN, National Bureau of Economic Research
Messrs. Modigliani and Zeman have attacked the interesting problem of
trying to show how corporations reach a decision on whether to issue debt
or equity capital in raising funds. I find their preliminary findings instruc-
tive but would like to raise a few questions as to the completeness of their
results before any definite conclusions can be drawn.
The approach of Modigliani and Zeman implies a very special type of
decision process, at the theoretical level, within the corporation. Decisions
about current operations (the use of manpower, raw materials, equipment,
etc.),aboutphysiëal capital expansion, dividend distribution, or the use
of internal or external funds do not appear explicitly in their theoretical
framework. They assume that debt-equity decisions are made in a com-
partment excluding the other types of decisions. I should prefer to see them
develop a general theory of corporate decisions and then show how debt-
equity decisions fit into the more complete scheme. If this were properly
done, I should expect that more variables would be called for in their basic
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It is hard to disagree with the proposition that th& relative prices of
debt and equity funds influence the debt-equity proportions of new issues.
I should certainly expect the relative prices of internal and external (debt
or equity) funds to be of some importance in this relation, and this raises
the difficult problem of measuring the imputed costs of using internal funds.
Greater generality should be achieved not only in the development of
the decision-making process of corporations but also in the network of
market relations involved. Is it a good assumption to claim that corpora-
tions accept market prices of bonds and shares as given variables and then
adjust to them in such a way that these market prices are not influenced by
the actions of individual companies? I seriously doubt that debt-equity
decisions of giant corporations have a negligible influence on the market
prices of their bonds or shares.
The market structure must also be carefully examined to determine
whether the observed correlation between the ratio of new issues of debt
to equity securities, on the one hand, and the ratio of prices of debt to
equity securities, on the other, describes the behavior of corporations, of
market investors, or of neither. The price ratio is an important variable
underlying corporate debt-equity decisions, but it is also important in
helping the individual 'investor to decide whether to purchase bonds or
shares. There, are undoubtedly other variables influencing decisions on
both sides of the securities market, and they must be introduced if the
statistical calculations are to be identified as estimates of particular pat-
terns of behavior.
Purely theoretical considerations will almost certainly not be adequate
to develop a satisfactory model of behavior in the securities market. Sev-
eral important institutional characteristics must also be taken into account.
For example, railroads raise a significant amount of funds through the
issuance of equipment trust certificates, a security that is specific to this
industry. Equipment trust certificates have been important in enabling
carriers to raise funds at reasonable interest rates and must have had a
profound influence on debt-equity discussions in the railroad industry.
This influence is, to a large extent, not reflected in market prices, but
rather in legal or institutional characteristics of these securities. Similarly,
railroad reorganization proceedings have achieved, by purely legal means,
a complete restructuring of corporations' balance sheets and current inter-
est payments. There can be no doubt that such legal decisions have
influenced debt-equity financing by railroads. A further example of the
influence of institutional characteristics in the securities market is the case
of those life insurance companies that are legally limited in the types of
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of these restrictions is shown by market prices of debt and equity funds.
Modigliani and Zeman use as one variable the ratio between new issues
of bonds and new issues of shares and as the other variable the ratio
between the yield on new issues of bonds and the yield on new issues of
shares. There is consistency in their procedure of using only new issues
throughout, but I wonder whether the analysis should not more correctly
be in terms of outstanding rather than new issues. The question is whether
basic decisions of corporations are made in terms of stocks or flows, as far
as securities are concerned. It is my feeling that the securities market should
be analyzed in terms of stocks rather than of flows. It so happens that the
theoretical and statistical treatment of the relationships involved is essen-
tially different for stock and for flow analysis.
Another specific variable that may be of some importance in debt-
equity decisions is the matter of corporate control. Many small corpora-
tions do not like to issue shares because that method of financing would
allocate a measure of control to persons outside an inner circle, say a
family. A factor of this sort may not be important for the statistical sample
of Modigliani and Zeman in which large corporations dominate the scene,
but it should be taken into account in a more complete analysis.
Two definite types of research possibilities seem to be open for further
studies along the lines initiated by Modigliani and Zeman. There is a wealth
of cross-section data available showing debt-equity structure and prices for
individual companies. A careful microeconomic analysis made from these
data would go far to supplement thee, aggregative time series analysis pre-
sented by the authors. Secondly, carefully designed surveys of business
firms may provide a basis for getting at some of the matters that cannot be
studied by conventional techniques applied to published data. We need to
learn much more about business attitudes toward debt, equity, and other
sources of funds. The personal interview technique seems well adapted to
this problem. Moreover, we need to find out the mechanics of the decision-
making process within corporations. This sort of information is essential
to the setting up of hypotheses about debt-equity decisions, among many
other types relevant to corporate operations.
Especially important for the work of Modigliani and Zeman is the
possibility of getting at subjective magnitudes through survey techniques.
One of their prices, the yield on shares, is really supposed to indicate the
rate at which future anticipated earnings must be discounted in order to
equal the present price per share of stock. The best method open to the
authors was to construct some function of past and current earnings as an
indicator of future anticipated earnings; but survey methods may bring us
much closer to a measure of a corporation's expected earnings. Naturally312 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
the application of survey, techniques must proceed with caution in this
area. The most advanced methods of sampling, interviewing, coding, edit-
ing, and general survey analysis must be used, but these will involve sub-
stantial costs. Problems arise as to whom to interview within a corporation
and what type of questions to ask. It is almost certain that casual surveys
using blunt, direct questionnaires will fail to elicit the correct responses.
As so many participants in this conference have indicated, decisions
about debt and equity financing are in themselves interesting. I mean this
especially in the sense that the analysis of these decisions presents a. chal-
lenging intellectual problem; but I do not mean to imply that the ratio of
debt to equity is necessarily a strategic economic magnitude. It remains to
be demonstrated whether equity financing is, in some economic or social
welfare sense, good, and that debt is bad. It is not at all certain that a
switch from equity to debt sources will cut down the flow of investment in
the economy.
I suppose that Modigliani and Zeman have, in the back of their minds,
anticipated further steps to be taken in the analysis after they have satisfied
themselves on the matter of explaining the debt-equity ratio. I should like
to see them make quite clear the implications of various debt-equity ratios
if these magnitudes are not to be thought of as ends in themselves.
GEORGE L. BACH, Carnegie Institute of Technology
The preliminary status of Messrs. Modigliani's and Zeman's statistical
explorations makes detailed criticism of their methods and findings inap-
propriate. But their inability, and that of others before them, to formulate
for investigation a satisfactory and testable hypothesis which specifically
includes business expectations suggests the appropriateness of some obser-
vations on research methodology in this area.
Faced with this and related difficulties, researchers in business finance
(and investment decision-making more generally) have turned toward
questionnaires and interviews with businessmen to get at the way expecta-
tions are formed and the bases on which business investment decisions
really depend. No doubt, useful information will be obtained through these
efforts, but I should like to sound a note of warning. Superficial generaliza-
tions concerning businessmen's motives, and rationalizations of profes-
sional economists' hypotheses, are dangerously easy to come by through
questionnaires and interviews. I have been led to a position of extreme
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mentsby businessmen, of high and low status, concerning the haphazard
manner in which they provide ("cook up") questionnaire information and
the naïveté which they feel most economists reveal in interviews aimed at
discovering business decision bases.
Most business decisions, financing or otherwise, are simply not the
one-spot careful weighing of economic (monetary) alternatives that most
of our business firm models imply. 1t is inevitable that we as researchers
will focus our questions (written or oral) on the elements that we expect
to be most important. Thus one of the greatest dangers is that we will close
out useful and novel insights that more fundamental and "unbiased" inves-
tigation might reveal. Partly this is a language problem between us and
the businessmen. More fundamentally it is the danger that we subcon-
sciously will want to have business behavior fit our theoretical molds and
thus fail to see what else there is to be seen. Only recently have we gener-
ally introduced liquidity and control motivations along with profit as likely
key considerations in business output and price decision-making, obvious
as these now seem. Development and acceptance of better-rounded hypoth-
eses in this field have a long way yet to go.
I suggest that we recognize financial decisions as merely one aspect of
the whole complex of implicit and explicit considerations that make up a
going business concern, and that we focus some of our analysis on the
going organization per se as a major area of business research. I suggest
that we make use of the insights the gradually growing modern literature
on organization theory can give us.' This approach seems to me clearly
essentialfor analysis of short-term (e.g., inventory) investment and financ-
ing decisions. Businessmen repeatedly are unable to separate out any few
simple key economic determinants for such business decisions. Acquain-
tance with going business concerns suggests that such decisions are seldom
really "made" by any one or two top officials. Rather, they develop sequen-
tially and often very informally through a series of lesser decisions at lower
points in the organization that gradually build up to something called "poi-
icy." Often the decisions are largely "automatic," in the sense that they
arise informally out of the formal and informal control procedures of the
firm (e.g., production scheduling and inventory controls) without con-
scious decision-making by officials. Mrs. Mack has pointed out an excel-
• lent example in the shoe industry, and Mr. Fulton has emphasized the
1refer especially to the work of men such as Herbert Simon (Administrative Be-
havior, Macmillan, 1947), and Chester I. Barnard (Functions of the Executive,
Harvard University Press, 1938), and of the growing circle of social scientists
working in the area loosely termed "group dynamics."314 RESEARCHIN BUSINESS FINANCE
same varied pattern of considerations for long-term investment and frnanc-
ing decisions.
Insofar as "decisions" are generated informally or formally by the
going organization, rather than being "made" by any one or few individual
officials, it becomes important to study in detail the organization as an
operating concern if we are really to understand, for example, how business
short-run financing steps are actually arrived at. In this sense, I suggest
that penetrating case studies (in collaboration with other social scientists)
of a few concerns as going organizations may be a more fruitful use of
resources than predominant emphasis on more narrowly focussed ques-
tionnaire and interview approaches. This implies not a few hours, but days
and weeks and even months, on each case study, with research time spent
in the firm in continuous skilled observation and examination, in contrast
to reliance on a few brief or even "depth" interviews. It implies, too, recog-
nition of the financial side as only one aspect of the decision-reaching
process —often,probably, only a very minor aspect. It implies a willing-
ness to search far outside our typical economics for new hypotheses,
insights, and analytical concepts.
Supplementing modern organization theory, the rapidly growing theory
of "servo-mechanisms" and "communications," especially as developed by
the electrical engineers and mathematicians, may be highly suggestive fore
the analysis of business firm behavior. In essence, this approach would
view any organization as a system of "reporting" and "feed-back" relation-
ships. Thus, various kinds of information are reported (formally or inform-
ally) to certain points in the organization, whereupon certain responses or
controls are "fed back" to the reporting points, inducing changed behaviOr
with correspondingly changed succeeding reports, and so on. The system
of servo-mechanisms and communications chains (corresponding to elec-
trical circuits in electrical engineering) may, of course, vary from simple
to highly complex. Looking at the business firm in this light, one would
thus see a variety of financial information fed into the reporting system at
various points, depending on the organizational arrangements involved.
These, for example, might be extensively or little utilized in the production
control process that primarily adjusts the output and inventory behavior
of the firm to changing information on sales prospects from outside.2
In the analysis of the aspects of long-run investment decisions,
2Somepilot research along these lines, though not with primary attention to business
financing, is now under way at Carnegie Institute of.Technology. The U.S. Air Forces
have substantial work under way on the implications of servo-mechanisms and corn-
munications theory for mobilization planning and production controls on an econ-
omy-wide basis.EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 315
thecase for emphasis on the "going organization" aspects of the problem
is less strong. This is largely because such decisions are made less fre-
quently, are usually of individual major importance, are given extended
separate attention by top officials, and are thus less apt to be "made"
informally and quasi-automatically by the ongoing organizational proc-
esses. But even here, we could profitably devote some research attention to
the approach I am suggesting. Long-run investment decisions often grow
out of a sequence of diverse smaller investment decisions, which at least
set the stage if they do not in fact determine what the final major decision
will be. Moreover, the servo-mechanism• analogy may again be helpful
here —e.g.,in analyzing the way in which sales forecasts and financial
market information are fed into the decision-making process and the chan-
nels and mechanisms the organization has for reacting to the various kinds
of information fed to it.3
I do not suggest that the particular research avenue I am emphasizing
should supplant the established historical-statistical approach, nor even
the questionnaire-interview techniques that have become so popular re-
cently. Case studies encompassing the whole organizational process are
expensive and time-consuming. They promise no quick generalizations,
nor even simple hypotheses for statistical testing. And they will appear
peculiarly unattractive to many economists because they involve actual
emphasis on other disciplines and major attention to noneconomic as well
as to economic factors, rather than mere lip-service to the broader ap-
proach. But by going outside our established research channels, whose
relatively narrow focus has often been remarked, we may be able at least
to develop some better-rounded hypotheses on business behavior. Perhaps
ultimately, with much aggregative historical-statistical testing, we may be
able to get at an acceptable theory of the behavior of business firms, which
seems to be so elusive when we use purely "economic" considerations. The
real promise of this one facet of over-all business research is much broader
A further note on the importance of explicitly recognizing organizational factors
was suggested in Professor Domar's comments on the business growth problem, when
it was stated that many concerns simply will not grow beyond certain rates because
of the organizational problem of assimilating new personnel and processes and of
adjusting to different levels and types of processes. Professor Domar's answer, inci-
dentally, that this can hardly be an important long-run factor because probably all
we will need is a 3 or 4 percent annual growth rate, overlooked a crucial aggregation
problem. A 3 percent growth rate for the economy has hinged, and probably will
continue to hinge, on much faster growth by key booming firms and industries, par-
tially offset by stable and declining sectors of the economy. Thus, organizational
restraints might be worth analysis as key restraints on the crucial growth elements
in the economy, even though only 3 percent per annum is needed over all.316 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
than the business finance area, and it may have little place in a financial
research program as such. But if, in fact, financing decisions are part and
parcel of broader going organization decision-making, we will not change
the reality nor enhance our understanding greatly by considering business
finance as though it were a neat separate compartment.